I think it's more that it's fairly true to say that for a basic set of desires, all humans want roughly the same things. There are variations when it comes to the more complex matters, but most of us want to live, comfortably, and feel secure in our possessions. The argument between the two of you seems horribly similar to the correlation/causation argument. It would certainly seem that morals are not subjective, by virtue of the fact that so many people share the same morals, but consider a similar situation:
Imagine there is a substance (like chocolate) that (virtually) everyone likes. Now, we know that taste and "liking" something is very, very subjective. There most certainly no objective list of things that taste good and things that taste bad. However, the fact that everyone like chocolate could lead to the assumption that the fact that chocolate tastes good is objective, rather than unanimously subjective. In this case, everyone wants the same things. The morals aren't necessarily objective (there is no overriding list of morals), but the simple fact that (almost) everyone's needs agree gives and impression of at least temporary objectivity.
Now, I'm not going to say that I'm right here, that's just my point of view, satisfying as it is to know that philosophers have felt the same way before me (I should really get around to reading philosophy more often, it might save me the time of discovering the conclusions myself :/), but ironically even the question of the objectivity of morals is relatively subjective. You may well be correct, tore, in that morals "evolved" in tandem with natural selection, but for the benefit of this discussion, they lead to virtually the same conclusion. It's really a question of how objective you feel "objective" needs to be (everything we see is subjective to our own experiences, impossible to be truly "objective" in the sense of being outside the system looking in as we cannot be outside existence, but to define objective by that level is useless, so one needs to define what the critical value of subjectivity is such that less subjectivity is relatively objective (or close enough as not to matter).
That is to say: morals and the discussion thereon is great, but if the argument of both sides reaches the same effective conclusion (with differing definitions of objective) then for the benefit of defining the "morality" of eating meat, it is safe to say that we agree that arguing the morality of it is moot seeing as morals effectively evolved, either as a biological or societal (or both) construct, and what is immoral to one is moral to another? Cause that's basically what I'm getting at. I feel I have a moral obligation not to mistreat an animal or torture it, but I have no problem with swiftly ending its life as painlessly as possible in order to have a satisfyingly meat-filled dinner. However, I can understand how others might disagree on that moral, and will do my best to allow for their moral beliefs, provided they are also willing to come to a moral compromise. i.e., I want to eat meat, and will always prefer to have meat in my food, but if you are eating at my house I will always make allowances for that, provide as good a vegetarian/vegan meal as I can manage, and I won't murder an animal on the table in front of you. And when I go to your house, I won't complain if the meal is vegetarian, because it would be rude of me to assume otherwise.
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